

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 006088
ORIGIN INR-07

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SSM-03 DODE-00 OC-06 CCO-00
CIAE-00 /027 R

DRAFTED BY INR/RNA:AAVACCARO:CA
APPROVED BY INR/RNA:PHSTODDARD
SSM-CWKONTOS
-----120535Z 012616 /23-11

R 112217Z JAN 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION SINAI

S E C R E T STATE 006088

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS:EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 230 - JANUARY 11, 1977

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. PALESTINIAN TERRORIST. THE ARREST OF PALESTINIAN LEADER ABU DAOUD (MAHMUD DAOUD AWDAAH) IN PARIS HAS PLACED FRENCH AUTHORITIES IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. FRENCH POLICE APPARENTLY MADE THE ARREST WITHOUT CONSULTING OTHER BRANCHES OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. THE POLICE INITIALLY STATED THAT ABU DAOUD WAS ARRESTED ON AN INTERNATIONAL WARRANT ISSUED BY WEST GERMANY. A FRENCH DOMESTIC BROADCAST, HOWEVER, REPORTED THAT A WEST GERMAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED MONDAY THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN AN INTERNATIONAL WARRANT AGAINST HIM. A WEST GERMAN JUSTICE MINISTRY OFFICIAL INDICATED TO EMBASSY BONN THAT THE BAVARIAN STATE AUTHORITIES HAD ISSUED A WARRANT ONLY AFTER THE FRENCH POLICE HAD ARRESTED ABU DAOUD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 006088

2. THE GERMANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE NOT OVERLY ANXIOUS TO TAKE ABU DAOUD OFF FRENCH HANDS, AND THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME INDECISION ON WHAT COURSE THE GERMANS SHOULD TAKE. PARIS, THEREFORE, WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF HIS ARREST, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE LONGER.

3. THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY ALSO FINDS ITSELF IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING POSITION. ABU DAOUD HAD MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ONLY LAST THURSDAY AS PART OF A PLO DELEGATION. THE MAJOR PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THE IMPACT OF THIS INCIDENT ON FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. THE ARABS ALREADY HAVE REACTED INDIGNANTLY. PROTESTS HAVE ARRIVED FROM LIBYA, IRAQ, ALGERIA AND SYRIA, AND NUMEROUS ARAB LEADERS HAVE WARNED THAT, DESPITE CLOSE TIES IN THE PAST, FRANCO-ARAB RELATIONS COULD BE THREATENED BY THE ARREST.

4. THE FRENCH MUST ALSO BE CONCERNED THAT, AS LONG AS ABU DAOUD REMAINS IN PRISON, PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS MAY ATTACK FRENCH FACILITIES OR AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO FORCE HIS RELEASE. (DURING THE 1973 TERRORIST INCIDENT IN KHARTOUM IN WHICH THE US AMBASSADOR WAS KILLED, ONE OF THE PALESTINIAN DEMANDS WAS THE RELEASE OF ABU DAOUD FROM A JORDANIAN PRISON.)

5. THE ISRAELIS ARE ALSO BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE FRENCH. AN ISRAELI SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT JERUSALEM HAD ASKED THAT ABU DAOUD BE DETAINED AS A PRELIMINARY STEP TO A FORMAL REQUEST FOR HIS EXTRADITION TO ISRAEL. ISRAELI AUTHORITIES, HOWEVER, WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED. MAARIV NOTED THAT "IT DOES NOT TAKE A PROPHET TO PREDICT THAT FRANCE WILL NOT EXTRADITE ARCHTERRORIST ABU DAOUD TO ISRAEL. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS NEVER SHOWED...A WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY TO FACE UP TO THE ARABS' ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BLACKMAIL."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 006088

(SECRET)

6. LEBANON. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE COLLECTION EFFORT IS NOT PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY. THE SYRIANS ALSO SEEM PESSIMISTIC. THEY ANTICIPATE THAT EACH FACTION WILL ONLY FURNISH A LIST OF ITS WEAPONS BY THE JANUARY 12 DEADLINE AND THAT "EVERY LIST WILL BE A LIE." THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, CLAIM TO KNOW WHERE 80 PERCENT OF THE HEAVY WEAPONS ARE BEING HIDDEN AND PLAN TO BEGIN A WIDESPREAD ARMS SWEEP ON JANUARY 13. ALTHOUGH UNABLE TO PREDICT HOW LONG THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE--AND THERE MIGHT BE SOME LIMITED FIGHTING--SYRIA APPEARS DETERMINED TO CRACK DOWN TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE.

7. EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTED THAT, FOLLOWING A JANUARY 8 MEETING, LEBANON'S CABINET HAD OFFICIALLY DECREED

THE CREATION OF A "NATIONAL INSTITUTION" TO PROVIDE GOVERNMENT INSURANCE GUARANTEES AGAINST THE RISKS OF WAR

AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES. LOCAL OBSERVERS VIEW THE MOVE AS AN ATTEMPT TO ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL AND ENCOURAGE LEBANESE INVESTORS TO INITIATE NEW PROJECTS AND REJUVENATE EXISTING FACTORIES. THE CABINET ALSO ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A "HOUSING BANK" TO FINANCE LOW-COST LOANS FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. ISRAEL. ADOPTING A RECOMMENDATION FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL BARAK, THE ISRAELI CABINET DECLARED YESTERDAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHARGES OF CORRUPTION AGAINST OFER WOULD BE CLOSED. HOWEVER, BARAK HAS SAID THAT PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS AGAINST PERSONS IMPLICATED ALONG WITH OFER SHOULD CONTINUE. FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE OPPOSITION LIKUD GROUP PREDICTABLY DEMANDED THAT THE OFER INVESTIGATION BE PURSUED, AND REQUESTED AN URGENT KNESSET DEBATE ON THE ISSUE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 006088

9. AFTER WAGING AN INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT 1976 TO EXPORT THE KFIR AIRCRAFT, ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI) APPEARS CLOSE TO FINALIZING THE FIRST FOREIGN SALE OF ITS \$4.5 MILLION, MACH 2.2 FIGHTER-BOMBER. THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE IN TEL AVIV WAS RECENTLY TOLD BY AN IAI OFFICIAL THAT A \$150 MILLION AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED WITH AN UNIDENTIFIED COUNTRY ON JANUARY 15.

10. SEVERAL PROSPECTIVE KFIR CUSTOMERS FREQUENTLY MENTIONED ARE AUSTRIA, SINGAPORE, SOUTH AFRICA, AND VENEZUELA. HOWEVER NONE IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO BUYING THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT. BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE IN QUITO, IT APPEARS THAT ECUADOR IS PROBABLY THE OTHER PARTY TO THE REPORTED JANUARY 15 AGREEMENT. SOURCES OF BOTH ATTACHES CONFIRM THAT 24 OR 25 AIRCRAFT ARE INVOLVED. INITIAL DELIVERIES ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN NOVEMBER OF THIS YEAR ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE IN QUITO.

11. IF CONSUMMATED, THE AGREEMENT WOULD REPRESENT ISRAEL'S LARGEST SINGLE MILITARY EXPORT ORDER. THE IAI IS PRODUCING THREE KFIRS PER MONTH AT ITS AIRFRAME PLANT NEAR BEN GURION AIRPORT. ABOUT 55 KFIRS HAVE BEEN PRODUCED SINCE SERIES PRODUCTION STARTED IN EARLY 1975. BASED ON IAI PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES AND PROJECTED ISRAELI AIR FORCE NEEDS, ISRAEL SHOULD BE ABLE TO MEET BOTH ITS DOMESTIC AND FUTURE EXPORT REQUIREMENTS. MOREOVER, ISRAEL URGENTLY

SECRET

NEEDS EXPORT REVENUES TO SUSTAIN ITS KFIR PRODUCTION LINE

AND HELP REDUCE ITS EVER-PRESENT BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS
PROBLEM. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

12. ALGERIA-MOROCCO. BOUTEFLIKA'S STATEMENT, IN HIS
LATE DECEMBER LETTER TO WALDHEIM, THAT SAUDI MEDIATION
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 006088

HAD FAILED SUGGESTS THAT ALGERIA IS CONTENT WITH MAINTAIN-
ING THE STATUS QUO ON THE WESTERN SAHARA AT LEAST IN
THE SHORT-RUN. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY ALGIERS, THE
POLISARIO FRONT APPEARS CAPABLE OF HOLDING ITS OWN
MILITARILY, DESPITE ITS CONTINUED LACK OF ARAB AND
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS. THE EMBASSY SEES NO
EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT POLISARIO GUERRILLAS ARE CAPABLE
OF SIGNIFICANTLY ESCALATING THE FIGHTING IN THE WESTERN
SAHARA. IT JUDGES THAT THE SAHARAN SHADOW REGIME AND
THE POLISARIO ARE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING CURRENT LEVELS
OF MILITARY ACTIVITY.

13. POLISARIO UNITS APPEAR TO BE BETTER EQUIPPED THAN
IN THE PAST. MOREOVER, THEY ARE ABLE TO MOVE FREELY
IN THE DESERT AND TO CONDUCT SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST
MOROCCAN AND MAURITANIAN UNITS.

14. MEANWHILE, MOROCCO'S SHARP REACTION TO ALGERIAN
"INTRANSIGENCE" HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY EXPRESSIONS OF
OPTIMISM ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION. EMBASSY RABAT
SOURCES POINT TO THE LOW LEVEL OF MOROCCAN MILITARY
CASUALTIES IN NOVEMBER, WHICH THEY ATTRIBUTE TO IMPROVED
COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS, PARTICULARLY LIMITED STRIKES
ACROSS THE ALGERIAN BORDER. THE EMBASSY NOTES, HOWEVER,
THAT SAUDI PEACE EFFORTS, WHICH BEGAN IN MID-NOVEMBER,
MAY HAVE REDUCED CASUALTIES BY LOWERING THE LEVEL OF
MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE EMBASSY ALSO JUDGES THAT IT IS TOO
EARLY TO ASSESS HOW THE NEW ELEMENT OF MOROCCO'S LIMITED
COUNTER-GUERRILLA STRIKES ACROSS THE ALGERIAN BORDER MAY
AFFECT MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION.
(SECRET)

ROBINSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SUMMARIES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 11-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE006088
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: AAVACCARO:CA
Enclosure: NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS
Executive Order: X2
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770011-0392
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770161/aaaacbvi.tel
Line Count: 214
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: c9092fdb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN INR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NOFORN
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NOFORN
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3622491
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INTSUM 230 - JANUARY 11, 1977 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
TAGS: PINR, EG, IS, XF
To: SINAI
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/c9092fdb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009